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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE 14TH AMENDENT-
"STATE ACTION" OR "HELPFUL COOPERATION"
By a four to three decision, the Court of Appeals of New York
has upheld the right of Stuyvesant Town Corporation, operating
a $90,000,000 housing project, to refuse to consider applicants
as tenants because of their race or color. The Stuyvesant Town
Corporation is organized under the Redevelopment Companies
Law of New York" and is entirely owned by the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. Both the Stuyvesant Town Corporation and
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. were joined as defendants
in this action instituted by Negro veterans and by a New York
taxpayer2 The majority opinion, in holding that a corporation
may discriminate against Negroes by refusing to rent to them,
reasoned that there was no "state action" involved which would
contravene the 14th Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. The court stated that there was only "helpful coopera-
tion" between the state and the corporation, and this helpful
cooperation did not constitute state action. In the dissent Fuld,
J., reasoned that a contract entered into by the Stuyvesant Town
Corporation and the City of New York constituted the requisite
state action. By the terms of the contract New York City agreed
to condemn all of the land needed for the housing project, and
agreed to grant the corporation tax exemption for twenty-five
years. The dissent also pointed out that there was a city or-
dinance which ratified the discriminatory conduct of Stuyvesant
Town.3 Thus the dissent said that the state itself had acted by
aiding and sanctioning Stuyvesant Town.4
The great prohibitions of the 14th Amendment are applicable
only to state action.' Thus it has long been settled that a state
1. N.Y. Redevelopment Companies Law § 3401 (McKinney's Unconsoli-
dated Laws).
2. Only the action brought by the Negro veterans will be discussed.
Consideration of the taxpayer's suit is beyond the scope of this comment.
3. The New York City ordinance involved prohibited any housing project
from discriminating against persons because of their race, color, or creed;
the ordinance exempted all housing projects started prior to the passage
of the ordinance. The only big housing project which came under the
exception to the ordinance was the Stuyvesant project, the existence of
which the New York City law-makers knew about. Thus the Stuyvesant
Town Corporation was permitted to discriminate with the express per-
mission of the New York ordinance.
4. Dorsey et al. v. Stuyvesant Town Corp. et al., 87 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y.
1949).
5. In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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statute or a local ordinance imposing a racial restriction upon
the purchase or occupancy or real estate is unconstitutional as
violative of the "equal protection of the law" clause of the
United States Constitution.6 However, a covenant inserted in a
deed, forbidding the occupancy of land by Negroes, of and by
itself, does not violate the Constitution.7 There is some authority
for the proposition that if there is a restriction as to whom the
fee holder of land may convey, this restriction is void as being
a restriction upon alienation.8 But the greater weight of au-
thority is otherwise.9 It has been generally held that restrictive
covenants are not contrary to the public policy of the individual
states.10 But in the recent case of Hurd v. Hodge: it was held
that the enforcement of the restrictive covenant provisions in
a deed by Federal Courts of the District of Columbia is contrary
to the public policy of the United States.
Thus the state courts recognized early that the 14th Amend-
ment imposed no shield against merely private conduct, no
matter how discriminatory. That which is held to be violative
of the Constitution must be state action.
The question arising in every restrictive covenant case or in
any other case involving discrimination is whether or not the
discrimination was founded on state action. In the Stuyvesant
case the majority of the court felt that there was no action by
6. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Richmond v. Deans, 281
U.S. 704 (1930). For a general treatment, see 10 AM. JuE. 908 and Note,
126 A.L.R. 638 (1940).
7. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919);
Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 320 (1922). But of. Gandolfo
v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892).
8. This view has prevailed in a few states, including California, Michi-
gan and West Virginia. See Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, supra note 7;
Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); White v. White,
108 W.Va. 128, 150 S.E. 531 (1929) (restriction involved was to endure
for fifty years). Contra: Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110 So. 801 (1926)(implied covenant by a landlord not to rent to a Negro).
9. Edwards v. W. Woodridge Theatre Co., 55 F.2d. 524 (D.C. Cir. 1931);
Chandler v. Zeigler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930); United Co-op. Realty
Co. v. Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563, 108 S.W.2d 507 (1937); Kohler v. Rowland,
275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).
10. Chandler v. Ziegler, supra note 9; Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc.
511, 296 N.Y.S. 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937). For a general discussion concerning
public policy, see Note, 3 A.L.R.2d (1949).
11. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). This case overruled Corrigan v. Buckley, 299
Fed. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924), appeal disnissed, 271 U.S. 323 (1925). In the
Hurd case, there was a suit by the owners in fee of certain real property
to enforce the restrictive covenants in their deeds. To permit the enforce-
ment of these covenants was held to be against public policy.
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the state; the dissent felt that there was. Thus the main problem
is what constitutes the necessary state action. It has been held
that state statutes and city ordinances constitute the requisite
state action.22 In the so-called "racial covenant cases" state
action within the meaning of the Constitution was the judicial
enforcement of the restrictive covenants.1 3 Where a private
corporation engages in discriminatory conduct, and the state
enforces that conduct by statute,1 or makes such action part of
the machinery of its functioning, 5 or requires other individuals
to conform to the contractual discriminatory pattern thus es-
tablished,", there is state action which may be challenged. Thus
state action has grown conceptually since the statement in Ex
Parte Virginia:
A state acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial
authorities. It can act in no other way.'7
In the instant case the majority opinion states that there was
no state action involved because the advantages accorded the
corporation under the New York Redevelopment Companies
Law did not subvert its status as a private organization. It is
clear that there was no direct state action which discriminated
as there was in all of the cases holding that a specific act was
12. See note 5 supra.
13. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); McGhee v. Sikes, 334 U.S.
1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Urciolo v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24 (1948). These four cases constitute the "Restrictive Covenant Cases."
The court went further than it had ever gone in saying what constituted
state action. Judicial discrimination might very well have been found to
be state action at any time after the decision in Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 331 (1880). But the holding that judicial enforcement of discrimina-
tory contracts was discriminatory "state action" was a step forward. In
Shilley v. Kmmer, supra at 14 the court said: "That the action of state
courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded
as action of the state within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, is a
proposition which has long been established by decisions of this court."
14. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In this case an entire town
was owned by a private corporation. A Jehovah's Witness was arrested
for distributing literature on the property of the corporation without its
consent, and was charged under an Alabama statute which made it a crime
to remain on another's premises after being warned not to do so. The
upper court reversed the defendant's conviction, stating that the state
allowed the corporation to use its property as a town, and therefore there
was state action which violated the 14th Amendment. The court also based
its decision on the fact that the state statute punishing criminally those
persons who attempted to distribute religious literature clearly violated
the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Constitution.
15. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944).
16. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
17. 100 U.S. 331, 347 (1880).
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unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals in order to
reach the contrary result would have had to hold that state
action includes indirect as well as direct acts by a state or its
agents. But this latter approach does not seem unreasonable.
It is not stretching the concept of what constitutes state action
too far to say that approval, acquiescence in, ratification of dis-
criminatory acts, and financial assistance given to a corporation
which discriminates, if done by a state, constitutes state action.
The state of New York, acting through its agent, New York
City, did the very things mentioned above. But New York City
was not the only agency through which New York state had
acted. Both Stuyvesant Town and the Metropolitan Insurance
Company are corporations. Corporations are in existence only
with the consent of the state. Therefore, corporations are crea-
tures of the state, and as such, act with state authority. Hence,
it is at least arguable that, when a corporation discriminates,
the state is discriminating. Corporate action can be said to
constitute state action as stated in the 14th Amendment. It is
conceded that the ancient doctrine of what constitutes state
action would have to be amplified; but under the social condi-
tions existing today, a contrary result in the Stuyvesant case
would be desirable practicably and correct judicially. It is sub-
mitted that the phrase "state action" has proved sufficiently
elastic in the past to bear the additional stretch necessary to
make it cover such a situation.
RICHARD L. Ross
CRIMINAL LAW - MINNESOTA YOUTH CONSERVATION ACT-
VALIDITY UNDER CONSTITUTION
The defendant, Meyer, an eighteen-year-old youth, pleaded
guilty to the crime of third degree burglarly. His objection to
the imposition of sentence under the Minnesota Youth Conser-
vation Act on the ground of its unconstitutionality was sus-
tained, and that question was certified to the Minnesota Supreme
Court. The appellate tribunal reversed the trial court, stating
that the Youth Conservation Act is not an invasion or infringe-
ment of the constitutional powers of any branch of government
nor a deprivation of any personal liberty or right guaranteed
thereini
1. State v. Meyer, 37 N. W. 2d 3 (Minn. 1949).
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